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 1  See, for example,  Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) ,  Report on the 
Surveillance Program Operated Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act ,  2 July 2014 ;  D.  Lyon ,  Surveillance Aft er Snowden ,  Polity Press ,  Cambridge  2015 . 
 2  As Tranberg has observed:  “ Th e key to deciding the extent of a person ’ s right to protection 
in connection with the processing of personal data has proved to lie largely in the ECJ ’ s 
application of the basic principle of proportionality ” :  C.B.  Tranberg ,  ‘ Proportionality and 
Data Protection in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice ’ ( 2011 )  1 ( 4 )  International 
Data Privacy Law  239, 239 . 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Security and law enforcement agencies have become reliant on the mass collection 
and analysis of data, especially personal data or potentially personal data, as 
an investigative tool, and oft en as a tool of fi rst recourse. 1 Th e mass collection 
and processing of data is, moreover, notionally independent of the geographical 
or legal jurisdiction in which the data originates. Th ese evolving practices give 
rise to considerable diffi  culties in determining the appropriate balance between 
national security and law enforcement objectives, on the one hand, and the 
protection of fundamental rights, on the other. Under the law of the European 
Union (the EU), the principle of proportionality is the single most important 
legal concept in establishing the balance between public interests, especially 
the interest in national security, and the fundamental rights to privacy and data 
privacy. 2 Th ere are, nevertheless, signifi cant complexities  – both conceptual 
and practical  – and unresolved issues, in satisfactorily applying this contested 
principle to rapidly changing social and technological circumstances, such as 




 3  Case C-362/14 ,  Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner   6 October 2015 . 
 4  See  Commission Decision of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the Safe Harbour 
privacy principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of 
Commerce, 2000/520/EC , [ 2000 ]  OJ L215 ( ‘ Safe Harbour decision ’ ). 
 5  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the Protection of individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data , [ 1995 ]  OJ L281 (the DPD) . 
practices cut across legal borders, including where data is transferred from 
one legal territory to another, such as occurs with trans-Atlantic fl ows of 
personal data. 
 In  Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner ( ‘ Schrems ’ ) , 3 the 
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that the Commission 
decision on the Safe Harbour Agreement, 4 which eff ectively authorised fl ows 
of personal data from the EU to the US, was invalid. Th e Court invalidated the 
decision on the basis that, contrary to Art. 25(1) of the 1995 Data Protection 
Directive ( ‘ DPD ’ ), 5 the agreement failed to provide an adequate level of 
protection for personal data. Underpinning this conclusion, however, were 
concerns with the disproportionate mass and indiscriminate collection and 
access to personal data (including data originating in the EU) by US intelligence 
agencies, as revealed by the whistle-blower, Edward Snowden. While these US 
practices complied with the Safe Harbour Agreement, the Court, in eff ect, held 
that such widespread, unconstrained surveillance would breach the fundamental 
rights to privacy and data privacy guaranteed by EU law which, under CJEU 
jurisprudence, must be protected to a  ‘ high level ’. 
 Th is chapter explains the  Schrems ruling, and the legal background to 
the ruling, from the particular perspective of the role of the principle of 
proportionality, as developed under EU law, in leading the Court to invalidate 
the Safe Harbour decision. In doing so, the chapter identifi es legal diffi  culties 
and uncertainties in the application of proportionality analysis to cases involving 
interference with the rights to privacy and data privacy. While a cursory reading 
might suggest that the ruling is based almost entirely on the interpretation 
and application of the  ‘ adequacy ’ test in Art. 25(1), this chapter contends 
that the ruling is better seen as an application of the CJEU ’ s jurisprudence on 
fundamental rights and proportionality to the context of unconstrained state 
access to cross-border fl ows of personal data. Beyond this, the chapter addresses 
two fundamental conceptual issues arising from the  Schrems ruling. First, the 
chapter explains and analyses the relationship between privacy and democracy 
in the context of contemporary surveillance practices, and the importance of 
an appropriately rigorous proportionality principle in reigning in apparently 
inexorable tendencies to unconstrained surveillance. Second, the chapter 
examines issues relating to the protection of rights against unconstrained 
Intersentia 51
3. Th e Role of Proportionality
extra-territorial state surveillance, contending that the controversy surrounding 
trans-Atlantic data fl ows should be seen in the broader context of the obligations 
of territorially based states in relation to the rights of those outside of their 
territories. 
 In essence, the main argument made in the chapter is that while the 
proportionality principle is the proper legal framework for analysing the balance 
between security and rights, the principle, as a matter of both EU law and 
international human rights law, needs to be more rigorously defi ned and applied 
so as to establish a satisfactory balance between the protection of fundamental 
rights, on the one hand, and appropriate deference to institutions responsible for 
public policy, on the other. Th e importance of the proportionality principle, and 
the relevance of the argument presented in this chapter, are further illustrated by 
debates concerning the adequacy of the political agreement reached between the 
US and the EU, proposed to replace the Safe Harbour Agreement, known as the 
Privacy Shield. Th e chapter therefore concludes with an explanation and analysis 
of the Privacy Shield, especially from the perspective of whether or not it allows 
for disproportionate interferences with the rights of EU persons. 
 2. PROPORTIONALITY UNDER EU LAW 
 While as a principle for balancing government objectives and the protection of 
individual rights, proportionality is compelling, as a matter of implementation 
it presents considerable diffi  culties. At the most general level, the principle of 
proportionality, in the context of the protection of rights, is simply that any 
interference with rights must be justifi able in accordance with a legitimate 
objective and, in addition, the means for pursuing the objective must not involve 
a disproportionate interference with rights. As Barak puts it: 
 Th ere are two main justifi catory conditions: an appropriate goal and proportionate 
means.  … Proportionality therefore fulfi lls a dual function: On the one hand, it allows 
the limitation of human rights by law, and on the other hand, it subjects these limitations 
to certain conditions; namely  – those stemming from proportionality. 6 
 Th e implementation of the principle of proportionality in positive legal regimes 
is, however, both complex and contestable; such that, in the European context, it 
is more accurate to speak of principles of proportionality, and quite misleading 
to assume that, except at the most general level, there exists a single uniform 
notion of proportionality. 
 6  A.  Barak ,  ‘ Proportionality and Principled Balancing ’ ( 2010 )  4 ( 1 )  Law  & Ethics of Human 




 Th e origins of the principle of proportionality in Europe can be traced 
to eighteenth and nineteenth century Prussian law, where it emerged as a 
principle for limiting the power of the administrative state. 7 Following the 
Second World War, it was accepted as a fundamental principle of German law, 
known as  Verh ä ltnismassigkeit , which still underpins the German rights-based 
constitution, or Basic Law. 8 Refl ecting the mutual interdependence between the 
protection of individual rights and public interest limitations on rights, both 
the protection of fundamental rights 9 and the principle of proportionality 10 
were later recognised as general principles of EU law in the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU. Article 52 of the EU Charter 11 now specifi cally provides that: 
 Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter 
must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. 
Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are 
necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or 
the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
 While the CJEU jurisprudence on fundamental rights (and, accordingly, on 
proportionality) draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States and from the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), the principle of proportionality under EU law diff ers from both the 
principle under the national laws of the Member States and the principle applied 
by the Strasbourg Court under the ECHR. 12 As formulated by the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court (UKSC) in  Bank Mellat v. Her Majesty ’ s Treasury 
(No. 2) , 13 the Strasbourg Court applied the following four-stage analysis in 
determining whether an administrative measure is proportionate: 
 1.  whether its objective is suffi  ciently important to justify the limitation of a 
fundamental right; 
 7  M.  Cohen-Eliya and  I.  Porat ,  ‘ American Balancing and German Proportionality: Th e 
Historical Origins ’ ( 2010 )  8 ( 2 )  I • CON (International Journal of Constitutional Law)  263 ; 
 N.  Emiliou ,  Th e Principle of Proportionality in European Law: A Comparative Study ,  Kluwer , 
 Th e Hague  1996 . 
 8  T.  Tridimas ,  Th e General Principles of EU Law ,  2 nd ed. ,  Oxford University Press ,  Oxford  2006 , 
 p. 136 ;  The  Rt. Hon. Lady Justice Arden ,  ‘ Proportionality: Th e Way Ahead? ’ [ 2013 ]  Public 
Law  498, 499 . 
 9  International Handelsgesellschaft  v. Einfurh-und Vorratsstelle Getreide ,  Case C-11/70 [ 1970 ] 
 ECR 125 . 
 10  Case C-331/88 ,  R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Ex p. Federation Europeene de 
la Sante Animale (FEDESA) [ 1990 ]  ECR I-4023 . 
 11  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [ 2000 ]  OJ C364/1 . 
 12  The Rt. Hon. Lady Justice Arden , above n. 8;  W. Sauter ,  ‘ Proportionality in EU Law: 
A Balancing Act? ’ TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2013-003, 25.01.2013,  http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2208467 . 
 13  Bank Mellat v. Her Majesty ’ s Treasury (No. 2) [ 2013 ]  UKSC 39 , at [20]. 
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 2.  whether it is rationally connected to the objective; 
 3.  whether a less intrusive measure could have been used; and 
 4.  whether, having regard to these matters and to the severity of the 
consequences, a fair balance has been struck between the rights of the 
individual and the interests of the community. 
 Th e clearest statement of the proportionality principle under EU law, on the 
other hand, was set out by the Luxembourg Court in the landmark  FEDESA 
case, in the following terms: 
 the lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic activity is subject to the condition 
that the prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the 
objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice 
between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and 
the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued. 14 
 Th e precise elements of the proportionality test under EU law are not expressed 
consistently, and have been formulated in diff erent terms by commentators and 
courts alike. On any formulation, however, it involves three components which, 
drawing on Tridimas, are as follows: 15 
 1.  Suitability  – whether the measure is suitable to achieve a legitimate aim. 
 2.  Necessity  – whether the measure is necessary to achieve that aim, namely, 
whether there are other less restrictive means capable of producing the 
same result. 
 3.  Proportionality  stricto sensu  – even if there are no less restrictive means, it 
must be established that the measure does not have an excessive eff ect on 
the applicant ’ s interests. 16 
 As the UKSC has explained in  R. (on the application of Lumsdon and others) 
v. Legal Services Board ( ‘ Lumsdon ’ ) , 17 the third question (proportionality  stricto 
sensu) , while sometimes addressed separately, is oft en omitted and incorporated 
into the necessity test. 18 
 14  Case C-331/88 ,  R. v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Ex p. Federation Europeene de 
la Sante Animale (FEDESA) [ 1990 ]  ECR I-4023 , at [13]. 
 15  T. Tridimas , above n. 8, p. 139. For a slightly diff erent, four-stage, formulation see: 
 W.  Sauter ,  ‘ Proportionality in EU Competition Law ’ ( 2014 )  35 ( 7 )  ECLR (European 
Competition Law Review)  327 . 
 16  As Tranberg points out, the three-part test at the EU level is analogous to the three components 
of the principle of proportionality under German law:  C.B. Tranberg , above n. 2, 240, citing 
 Kreutzberg-Urteil , PrOVG [ 1882 ]  E 9 , at 353. 
 17  R. (on the application of Lumsdon and others) v. Legal Services Board [ 2015 ]  UKSC 41 , at [33]. 




 In its important judgment in  Lumsdon , the UKSC provided a helpful 
summary of the Luxembourg jurisprudence, 19 including an explanation of the 
diff erent levels of scrutiny applied by the CJEU in assessing measures adopted 
by EU institutions, on the one hand, and national measures implementing EU 
law, on the other. 20 In short, in assessing EU-level measures, the Court applies 
a  ‘ manifestly inappropriate ’ test (as opposed to a  ‘ least restrictive means ’ test), 
whereas in evaluating national measures that may derogate from fundamental 
rights and freedoms the Court applies the stricter  ‘ less restrictive alternative ’ 
test. Th e main explanation for the diff erent standards is that, where national 
implementation of an EU measure is concerned, the CJEU is  ‘ concerned fi rst and 
foremost with the question whether a member state can justify an interference 
with a freedom guaranteed in the interests of promoting the integration of the 
internal market, and the related social values, which lie at the heart of the EU 
project ’. 21 
 Within these broad parameters, it is important to appreciate that, under 
EU law, there is considerable fl exibility in the application of the principle of 
proportionality to particular disputes. 22 As the UKSC observed in  Lumsdon: 
 any attempt to identify general principles risks conveying the impression that the 
court ’ s approach is less nuanced and fact-sensitive than is actually the case. As in the 
case of other principles of public law, the way in which the principle of proportionality 
is applied in EU law depends to a signifi cant extent upon the context. 23 
 Given this background, we can now examine how the principle of proportionality 
has been applied in EU data privacy law. 
 3. PROPORTIONALITY AND EU DATA PRIVACY LAW 
 Th e signifi cance of the legal context to the application of the principle of 
proportionality is nowhere better illustrated than in how the CJEU has applied 
the principle to cases involving the extent to which measures, whether at the EU 
or national levels, may interfere with the fundamental right to data privacy. Th e 
relevant legal context involves, fi rst of all, the terms of the DPD, which under 
Recital (10) is aimed at ensuring a  ‘ high level ’ of protection of data privacy and, 
 19  Th e CJEU is, however, the only authoritative source on the meaning of proportionality under 
EU law. 
 20  [2015] UKSC 41, at [40] – [82]. See also  W. Sauter , above n. 12. 
 21  [2015] UKSC 41, at [37]. 
 22  Th us, proportionality has been referred to as a  ‘ fl exi-principle ’ :  R. (ProLife Alliance) v. British 
Broadcasting Corporation [ 2004 ]  1 AC 185 , at [138] per Walker LJ. 
 23  [2015] UKSC 41, [23]. 
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under Art. 1, has the express objective of protecting the rights and freedoms 
of natural persons and, in particular, their right to privacy. Th is high level of 
protection is reinforced by the EU Charter, which must be taken into account in 
the interpretation of the DPD and which, in Art. 8, recognises a distinct right to 
data privacy, such that it is an independent right and not subsidiary to the more 
general right to privacy (recognised in Art. 7). 
 In a series of rulings, the CJEU has adopted a strict approach to the application 
of the necessity component of the proportionality principle in the context of 
determining permissible limits on the right to data privacy. Th e best starting 
point for understanding the Court ’ s approach is the ruling in  Satamedia. 24 Th at 
case concerned the publication of extracts of public data, including names and 
income brackets, by a Finnish regional newspaper. Th e key issue addressed by 
the Court concerned the balance to be struck between the rights to privacy and 
personal data, on the one hand, and the right to freedom of expression, on the 
other. Article 9 of the DPD establishes a balance by allowing exemptions or 
derogations for the processing of personal data  ‘ carried out solely for journalistic 
purposes  … only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the 
rules governing freedom of expression ’. In interpreting the legislative balance in 
the light of the importance of the right to privacy, the CJEU stated that: 
 in order to achieve a balance between the two fundamental rights, the protection of the 
fundamental right to privacy requires that the derogations and limitations in relation 
to the protection of data provided for in  … [the DPD]  … must apply only in so far as 
is strictly necessary. 25 
 While the Court in  Satamedia adopted an expansive interpretation of 
 ‘ journalistic purposes ’, for the fi rst time it interpreted the test for confi ning 
legitimate exceptions and derogations as requiring  ‘ strict necessity ’, a concept 
that was expanded upon in subsequent cases. 26 
 Th e  Satamedia approach was further elaborated by the Court in a case 
involving the Common Agricultural Policy,  Schecke . 27 In that case, the German 
state of Hesse had published the names of recipients of funding, their postal 
codes and the amounts received on a publicly accessible, searchable website. 
Finding that the requirement for publication of personal data under relevant 
EU regulations was an interference with the rights to privacy and data privacy 
guaranteed by the Charter, the Court turned to a consideration of whether the 
limitation was proportionate. Applying the  ‘ strict necessity ’ test from  Satamedia , 
 24  Case C-73/07 ,  Satakunnan Markkinap ö rssi and Satamedia [ 2008 ]  ECR I-9831 . 
 25  Ibid., at [56]. 
 26  C.B. Tranberg , above n. 2, 245. 




the CJEU held that the regulations imposed a disproportionate interference with 
privacy rights as  ‘ it is possible to envisage measures which aff ect less adversely 
the fundamental right of natural persons and which still contribute eff ectively 
to the objectives of the European Union rules in question ’. 28 Accordingly, the 
Court ruled that, in introducing the regulations, the EU institutions had not 
established a proportionate balance between the transparency-related objectives 
of public disclosure, on the one hand, and the protection of the Art. 7 and 8 
rights, on the other. 
 In  Digital Rights Ireland , 29 the CJEU ruled that the 2006 Data Retention 
Directive, 30 which imposed mandatary metadata retention requirements for 
a period of up to two years on private telecommunications service providers, 
was invalid as a disproportionate interference with fundamental Charter rights. 
Turning fi rst to the question of whether the directive interfered with the relevant 
rights, the Court held that both the retention requirements and the access 
arrangements in the directive amounted to interferences, to both the Art. 7 
and 8 rights, that were  ‘ wide-ranging ’ and  ‘ particularly serious ’. 31 In addition, 
the Court found that the mass retention and use of metadata without the data 
subjects being informed was likely to create a generalised feeling of constant 
surveillance. 32 
 Although the Court held that the data retention law did not aff ect the  ‘ essence ’ 
of the Charter right to privacy, as it did not concern retention of or access to 
communications content, and that the prevention of terrorism and crime were 
legitimate objectives of general interest, the case turned on an assessment of 
whether the interferences were proportionate. Where EU legislation is subject to 
judicial review on the basis of interference with fundamental rights, the Court ’ s 
case law embodies a degree of fl exibility in the application of the principle, 
depending on the area concerned, the nature of the right, the nature and 
seriousness of the interference and the object pursued by the interference. 33 In 
the circumstances of this case, the Court held that: 
 in view of the important role played by the protection of personal data in the light of 
the fundamental right to respect for private life and the extent and seriousness of the 
 28  Ibid., at [86]. 
 29  Joined  Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12  Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, 
Marine and Natural Resources [ 2013 ]  ECR I-847 . 
 30  Directive 2006/24 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with 
the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public 
communications networks and amending Directive [ 2006 ]  OJ L105/54 . 
 31  Joined  Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12  Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, 
Marine and Natural Resources [ 2013 ]  ECR I-847 , at [37]. 
 32  Ibid. 
 33  Ibid., at [47]. 
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interference with the right caused by Directive 2006/24, the EU legislature ’ s discretion 
is reduced, with the result that review of that discretion should be strict. 34 
 Moreover, in relation to the crucial component of necessity, the Court applied 
the established case law on the rights to privacy and data privacy which, as 
explained above, permits derogations and limitations to the extent only that they 
are strictly necessary. 35 
 As the data retention obligations under the directive applied indiscriminately 
to all electronic communications, and to all persons using electronic 
communications, even where there was no evidence of a link, however indirect, 
with serious crime or a threat to national security, the directive constituted 
an interference that was not strictly necessary. 36 Additionally, the absence of 
substantive and procedural safeguards in relation to access to the retained 
metadata rendered the interference more than strictly necessary. Taking 
into account the over-broad scope of the directive, and the lack of adequate 
safeguards, the CJEU ultimately concluded that the Data Retention Directive 
entailed  ‘ a wide-ranging and particularly serious interference with those 
fundamental rights in the legal order of the EU, without such interference being 
limited to what is strictly necessary ’. 37 
 As these cases illustrate, the jurisprudence of the CJEU, in the context of 
cases alleging infringements of the fundamental rights to privacy and data 
privacy, has displayed an increasingly rigorous or  ‘ rights protective ’ approach in 
the application of the proportionality principle and, in particular, its necessity 
component (which, as explained above, in practice oft en incorporates, or 
substitutes for, an assessment of proportionality  stricto sensu ). Concomitantly, 
this increased level of scrutiny has entailed progressively less deference to 
EU-level laws. 38 
 Nevertheless, the fl exibility in the application of the level of scrutiny applied 
by the Court gives rise to some uncertainty in the application of the principle. 39 
First, there are questions about whether or not the strict scrutiny applied to 
infringements of rights applies to all Charter rights, or applies to some rights 
and not to others. To date, the strict level of scrutiny evident in cases such as 
those dealt with above appears to be confi ned to rights to non-discrimination, 
due process, property, and privacy and data privacy. 40 Although the CJEU 
 34  Ibid., at [48]. 
 35  Ibid., at [52]. 
 36  Ibid., at [59]. 
 37  Ibid., at [65]. 
 38  M-P.  Granger and  K.  Irion ,  ‘ Th e Court of Justice and the Data Retention Directive in 
Digital Rights Ireland: telling off  the EU legislator and teaching a lesson in privacy and data 
protection ’ ( 2014 )  39 ( 6 )  E.L. Rev. (European Law Review)  835, 845 . 
 39  Ibid., 846. 




eschews the creation of a hierarchy of rights, it seems clear, especially from 
recent jurisprudence, that some rights, including the rights to privacy and data 
privacy, have been accorded particular protection. Second, there are questions 
about the relationship between the nature of the interference with the relevant 
rights and the level of intensity of the proportionality analysis. While the 
Court ’ s jurisprudence clearly establishes that the more serious an interference 
with rights the more likely the interference will be disproportionate, the precise 
relationship between the seriousness of an interference and the level of scrutiny 
remains uncertain. In  Digital Rights Ireland , however, the Court clearly took the 
seriousness of the interference into account in applying a strict level of review. 
In addition, there is little guidance on the circumstances that may lead the 
Court to conclude that an interference is  ‘ wide-ranging ’ or  ‘ particularly serious ’, 
such as to justify strict review. Th ird, while the Court in  Digital Rights Ireland 
emphasised the fl exibility in the application of the principle of proportionality, 
taking into account a variety of circumstances, there is a lack of precision as 
to what strict review of an EU measure actually entails. As explained above, 
the CJEU has applied a  ‘ manifestly inappropriate ’ test when assessing the 
proportionality of EU-level measures, giving a degree of deference to EU policy-
making institutions. While it is clear that where strict review is applied the 
deference given to EU institutions is reduced, precisely how this might aff ect 
the  ‘ manifestly inappropriate ’ analysis is not clear. A number of considerations 
are relevant here. As the UKSC pointed out in  Lumsdon , the CJEU  ‘ has not 
explained how it determines whether the inappropriateness of a measure is or is 
not manifest ’. 41 Furthermore, at least in some cases, the Court has applied a  ‘ least 
restrictive means ’ test to an EU-level measure in preference to the  ‘ manifestly 
inappropriate ’ test, meaning that a measure will be regarded as disproportionate 
unless it is the least restrictive means of achieving a legitimate public interest 
objective. 42 It is therefore unclear whether the strict standard of review referred 
to in the cases culminating in  Digital Rights Ireland is simply more likely to 
fi nd a measure to be  ‘ manifestly inappropriate ’, whether it entails applying a 
 ‘ least restrictive means ’ test, or whether the standard is somewhere between 
the  ‘ manifestly inappropriate ’ and  ‘ least restrictive means ’ tests. To be clear, 
I am not suggesting that the Court adopt an overly-rigid approach in assessing 
the proportionality of an interference with fundamental rights; merely that the 
legal tests for scrutinising EU-level laws should be more clearly and precisely 
explained. Th e need for greater analytical precision is clearly illustrated by the 
substantial legal uncertainty, following the CJEU decision in  Digital Rights 
 41  [2015] UKSC 41, at [42]. 
 42  See  W. Sauter , above n. 12, p. 13, citing  Case C-210/03  Swedish Match UK Ltd [ 2004 ] 
 ECR I-11893 . 
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Ireland , concerning whether bulk data collection by intelligence agencies can 
ever be proportionate. 
 Bearing these observations on the application of the proportionality principle 
in the context of the right to data privacy in mind, we can turn to an analysis of 
the  Schrems decision. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to explain some 
recent practices of US government security agencies in collecting and accessing 
personal data originating from outside the US, as revealed by Edward Snowden 
in 2013. 
 4.  THE SNOWDEN REVELATIONS AND 
THE PRISM PROGRAMME 
 Starting in June 2013, the Snowden revelations altered the public understanding 
of the extent to which US security agencies have accessed and processed 
data originating from outside the US, including data sourced from the EU. 43 
On 6 June 2013, one day aft er the publication of the fi rst reports that the US 
National Security Agency (NSA) was collecting telecommunications log records 
from Verizon,  Th e Guardian and  Th e Washington Post published details of 
a programme, popularly known as PRISM, under which the NSA collected a 
range of data from large Internet companies, including Google, Microsoft  and 
Facebook. 44 Th e reports, based on 41 PowerPoint slides leaked by Edward 
Snowden, revealed the mass collection of Internet data, including both content 
and metadata, under the authority of the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (the FISA Court). 45 
 To date, the most comprehensive explanation of the operation of the PRISM 
programme is contained in a July 2014 report by the US Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) on surveillance programmes authorised 
pursuant to section 702 of the US Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978. 46 
 43  Although, as Hogan J. in the Irish High Court observed,  ‘ only the na ï ve or the credulous 
could really have been surprised ’ by the Snowden revelations, the factual details revealed by 
Edward Snowden confi rmed suspicions and exposed disingenuous denials:  Schrems v. Data 
Protection Commissioner [ 2014 ]  IEHC at [4] . 
 44  B.  Gellman and  L.  Poitras ,  ‘ US Intelligence Mining Data from Nine U.S. Internet 
Companies in Broad Secret Program ’ ,  Th e Washington Post ,  6 June 2013 ,  < https://www.
washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-
companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_
story.html > ;  G.  Greenwald and  E.  MacAskill ,  ‘ NSA Taps in to Internet Giants ’ Systems to 
Mine User Data, Secret Files Reveal ’ ,  Th e Guardian ,  6 June 2013 ,  < http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data > . 
 45  For the slides see: PRISM/US-984XN Overview, April 2013,  < https://www.aclu.org/fi les/
natsec/nsa/20130816/PRISM%20Overview%20Powerpoiny%20Slides.pdf > . 




Section 702 establishes a regime under which the US Attorney General and the 
Director of National Intelligence may jointly authorise surveillance of non-US 
persons, who are reasonably believed to be located outside of the US, in order to 
acquire foreign intelligence information. 47 Th e government authorisations must 
be approved by the FISA Court, which operates in secret. Once approval has 
been given, written directives are sent to the Internet companies requiring them 
to assist in the collection of data. 
 Th e data collected is based on certain  ‘ selectors ’, such as telephone numbers 
or e-mail addresses, associated with targeted persons. Once the government 
sends a selector to an Internet company, the company is compelled to pass on all 
communications sent to or from that selector. Th e NSA receives all of the data 
generated by the PRISM programme, while the CIA and FBI receive portions of 
the data. 48 Each of the relevant intelligence agencies has certain minimisation 
procedures, approved by the FISA Court, that restrict the use, retention and 
disclosure of the collected data. 
 Th e collection of data under the PRISM programme has been extensive. As 
the PCLOB report explained:  ‘ Compared with the  “ traditional ” FISA process  … , 
Section 702 imposes signifi cantly fewer limits on the government when it targets 
foreigners located abroad, permitting greater fl exibility and a dramatic increase 
in the number of people who can realistically be targeted. ’ 49 Furthermore, 
according to the report, about 91 per cent of Internet communications obtained 
by the NSA each year are acquired from the PRISM programme, 50 with an 
estimated 89,138 persons being targeted in 2013. 51 While the programme is 
targeted at non-US persons, there is considerable incidental collection of data 
relating to US citizens. At the time of writing, US Senate Judiciary Committee 
hearings had commenced on the re-authorisation of section 702, which is 
currently scheduled to expire in December 2017. 52 In the context of this chapter, 
it is important to note that, although there has been considerable focus on the 
PRISM programme, it is but one of a range of US intelligence agency programmes 
which may involve the collection of personal data of Europeans. In particular, a 
range of data collection activities, the precise scope of which remain unclear, are 
authorised by Executive Order 12333 (EO-12333). 
 47  50 U.S.C. sec. 1881a, introduced by the FISA Amendment Act 2008. For a comprehensive 
explanation of the history of s. 702 see:  L.K.  Donohue ,  ‘ Section 702 and the Collection of 
International Telephone and Internet Content ’ ( 2015 )  38  Harv. J.L.  & Pub. Pol ’ y (Harvard 
Journal of Law  & Public Policy)  117 . 
 48  Th e collection is undertaken by the Data Intercept Technology Unit (DITU) of the FBI, 
acting on behalf of the NSA: PCLOB, above n. 1, p. 33. 
 49  PCLOB, above n. 1, pp. 9 – 10. 
 50  Ibid., pp. 33 – 34. 
 51  Ibid., p. 33. 
 52  ‘ Senate Judiciary Committee holds fi rst public review of Section 702 surveillance programs ’ , 
 http://www.openthegovernment.org/node/5209 , 12 May 2016. 
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 5. THE  SCHREMS DECISION 
 5.1. BACKGROUND 
 Th e Snowden revelations, and especially those concerning the PRISM 
programme, form the background to a complaint made by the Austrian privacy 
activist, Maximillian Schrems, to the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (the 
IDPC) in June 2013. Th e complaint concerned the mass transfer of personal data 
from Facebook Ireland to its US parent, Facebook Inc. Within Europe, Facebook 
users are required to enter into agreements with Facebook Ireland, which stores 
the data on servers in Ireland and transmits the data to servers in the US. As 
Facebook Inc. is a company subject to authorisations under the section 702 
programme, personal data transmitted by Facebook to the US may be collected 
and stored by the NSA. As a Facebook user, Schrems complained that Facebook 
Ireland was facilitating over-broad access to his personal data by US intelligence 
agencies and, accordingly, that the IDPC should direct Facebook Ireland to cease 
transferring personal data to the US. 
 Th e IDPC rejected the Schrems complaint, principally on the basis that 
as the transfers were authorised by the Safe Harbour Agreement between 
the EU and the US, 53 the Commissioner was prevented from investigating 
the complaint. Th e Safe Harbour Agreement was adopted by a decision of the 
Commission in July 2000, pursuant to Art. 25(6) of the DPD. While Art. 25(1) 
of the DPD sets out the principle that EU Member States must provide that 
transfer of personal data to a third country may take place only if that country 
ensures an adequate level of protection, Art. 25(6) establishes a mechanism for 
the Commission to determine that a third country ensures an adequate level of 
protection. 
 Th e Safe Harbour Agreement, which was negotiated between the EU and 
the US to ensure the viability of the trans-Atlantic transfer of personal data, 
consisted of a set of privacy principles, implemented in accordance with 
guidance provided by frequently asked questions (FAQs), both issued by the 
US Department of Commerce on 21 July 2000. Th e privacy principles included 
broad obligations relating to: providing notice of collection and processing of 
personal data; disclosure of personal data to third parties; data security and data 
integrity; and access to, and correction of, personal data. Th e scheme, intended 
for use by US private sector organisations receiving personal data from Europe, 
operated entirely by means of self-certifi cation. As explained in the FAQs, the 
main mechanism for enforcing the self-regulatory scheme was by the US Federal 





Trade Commission (FTC) taking action on the basis of deceptive representations 
of compliance with the privacy principles. 
 Th e fourth paragraph to Annex I of the Commission decision adopting 
the Safe Harbour Agreement established signifi cant derogations limiting the 
application of the principles. In particular, the decision allowed for derogations 
 ‘ to the extent necessary to meet national security, public interest, or law 
enforcement requirements ’ and  ‘ by statute, government regulation, or case-law 
that create confl icting obligations or explicit authorisations, provided that, in 
exercising any such authorisation, an organisation can demonstrate that its non-
compliance  … is limited to the extent necessary to meet the overriding legitimate 
interests furthered by such authorisation ’. Moreover, Part B of Annex IV of the 
Commission decision provided that, in the event of confl icting obligations 
imposed by US law, organisations were required to comply with the US law. 
 Following the rejection of his complaint, Schrems applied to the Irish High 
Court for judicial review of the IDPC decision. Th e main issue before the Court 
was whether the Commission decision fi nding that the Safe Harbour Agreement 
provided an adequate level of protection conclusively prevented complaints 
about data transfers from Facebook Ireland to its US parent falling within the 
scope of the agreement. Hogan J., making limited distinctions between the 
various NSA programmes, simply concluded that, once in the US, the Facebook 
data was subject to  ‘ mass and indiscriminate surveillance ’ by the NSA. 54 If 
the question were to be determined in accordance with Irish national law, the 
national court held that this level of mass and undiff erentiated surveillance 
would create a serious issue as to whether it was a disproportionate interference 
with the fundamental rights to dignity, autonomy and privacy protected by the 
Irish constitution. 55 
 However, as the case concerned a Commission decision made pursuant to an 
EU level directive and, accordingly, the implementation of EU law by a Member 
State, review of the IDPC decision fell to be determined by EU law, and especially 
by reference to the rights guaranteed by the EU Charter. Given the express 
protection of data privacy by Art. 8 of the Charter, mass and undiff erentiated 
surveillance with weak judicial oversight, and with no appeal rights for EU data 
subjects, would likely breach the Charter. Th at said, the Irish data protection law, 
on its face, prevented the IDPC from second-guessing a Commission decision 
on adequacy. Th e key questions in the case were therefore whether the IDPC 
was bound by the Commission ’ s Safe Harbour decision, which necessarily raised 
the issue of whether the Safe Harbour Agreement complied with EU law. In this 
respect, the High Court of Ireland observed that, as the Charter entered into 
 54  Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner [ 2014 ]  IEHC 310 (18 June 2014), at 
[13]. 
 55  Ibid., at [52]. 
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eff ect aft er the Safe Harbour Agreement, it was essential to determine whether 
the agreement should be re-evaluated in the light of the Charter. Th e national 
court therefore referred the issue of whether the IDPC was bound by the Safe 
Harbour Agreement or whether, taking into account developments since the 
agreement, it could conduct an independent investigation, to the CJEU for a 
ruling. 
 5.2. THE CJEU RULING 
 On 6 October 2015, the CJEU handed down its ruling fi nding that, fi rst, the 
Commission ’ s Safe Harbour decision did not prevent a national supervisory 
authority, such as the IDPC, from examining whether or not a third country 
ensures an adequate level of protection and, second, that the Safe Harbour 
decision was, as a matter of EU law, invalid. 56 
 In evaluating the powers of EU data protection regulators, the Court placed 
considerable emphasis on the legal requirements for national supervisory 
authorities to act independently, as derived both from the Charter and the DPD. 
In relation to the Charter while, as explained above, Art. 8 relevantly establishes 
an express right to data privacy, signifi cantly, Art. 8(3) specifi cally requires rules 
protecting data privacy to be subject to control by an independent authority. 
Furthermore, Art. 28(1) of the DPD, which must be interpreted in light of the 
Charter, expressly requires national supervisory authorities to  ‘ act with complete 
independence ’. Consequently, although the Safe Harbour Agreement, while 
in force, was binding on EU Member States and their organs, the Court held 
that this could not prevent national regulators from independently examining, 
pursuant to Art. 28, claims that the transfer of personal data to third countries 
was in breach of the rights and freedoms conferred by the Charter. In this respect, 
the Court emphasised that  ‘ the European Union is a union based on the rule of 
law in which all acts of its institutions are subject to review of their compatibility 
with, in particular, the Treaties, general principles of law and fundamental 
rights ’. 57 Consequently, although only the CJEU has the competence to declare 
invalid an EU-level act, such as the Safe Harbour decision, the Court held that, 
if a supervisory authority were to fi nd a breach of the Charter rights, national 
legislation must provide for recourse to national courts which, in turn, can 
make a reference to the CJEU. 58 In other words, while national supervisory 
authorities could not rule on the validity of the Safe Harbour Agreement, this 
did not prevent them from independently examining claims that the processing 
of personal data by third countries was in breach of Charter rights. 
 56  Ibid. 
 57  Ibid., at [60]. 




 Given that the transfer of personal data by Facebook to the US complied 
with the Safe Harbour Agreement, the fundamental underlying question raised 
by the case concerned the validity of the Commission decision on adequacy, 
interpreting the DPD adequacy requirement in the light of the Charter. As 
explained above, the combination of the Art. 8 right and the express text of the 
DPD result in a high level of legal protection of data privacy in the EU. On 
this basis, the CJEU held that to comply with the adequacy test, a third country 
must ensure a level of protection which, while not identical, was  ‘ essentially 
equivalent ’ to that conferred by EU Member States. 59 Furthermore, the 
importance given to the right to data privacy under the EU legal regime led the 
Court to conclude that, fi rst, in reviewing the Safe Harbour decision, account 
must be taken of circumstances arising subsequent to the decision and, second, 
that the Commission decision should be subject to strict scrutiny. 
 In applying the  ‘ manifestly inappropriate ’ test to EU measures, the CJEU 
traditionally held that the assessment must be made at the time of the adoption 
of the measure, as future eff ects of rules cannot be predicted with accuracy. In 
 Jippes , for example, the Court stated that: 
 Where the Community legislature is obliged to assess the future eff ects of rules to 
be adopted and those eff ects cannot be accurately foreseen, its assessment is open to 
criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information available 
to it at the time of the adoption of the rule in question. 60 
 In  Gaz de France  – Berliner Investissements , 61 however, the Court appeared to 
open the door to consideration of factors arising aft er the adoption of a measure 
in certain limited circumstances. Given that the Snowden revelations concerning 
widespread collection and access to data by US government authorities 
occurred long aft er the Safe Harbour decision, the extent to which subsequent 
developments can be taken into account in assessing the validity of the decision 
was especially important. Th e legal issues were dealt with in some detail in the 
advisory opinion of Advocate General Bot. 62 
 Taking advantage of the limited qualifi cation to the rule against retrospective 
assessment allowed in  Gaz de France , the Advocate General emphasised the 
particular characteristics of a Commission decision on adequacy which favour 
its assessment by reference to circumstances in existence at the time of the ruling 
rather than the time of the adoption of the measure. In sum, the Advocate General 
concluded that as a decision on adequacy is intended to have an ongoing eff ect, 
 59  Ibid., at [74]. 
 60  Case C-189/01  Jippes and Others [ 2001 ]  ECR I-5689 , at [84]. 
 61  Case C-247/08 ,  Gaz de France  – Berliner Investissements  EU:C:2009:600 . 
 62  Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner ,  Case C-362/14, Opinion of Advocate 
General Bot ,  23 September 2015 . 
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whether or not the legal protection provided by a third country is adequate 
must  ‘ evolve according to the factual and legal context prevailing in the third 
country ’. 63 Th erefore, even though the continuation in force of a Commission 
decision amounts to an implied confi rmation of the original assessment, where a 
reference has been made to the Court to determine the validity of a Commission 
decision, taking into account the ongoing eff ect of the decision the Court can 
appropriately examine circumstances that have arisen since the decision was 
adopted, which may cast doubt on the continued validity of the decision. 64 In its 
ruling, the CJEU essentially confi rmed the approach adopted by the Advocate 
General, such that an adequacy decision must be reviewed in the light of legal 
and factual circumstances that may have arisen since the decision was adopted. 65 
In eff ect, the Court is not merely reviewing the original adequacy decision, but 
the Commission ’ s ongoing obligation to review the adequacy of third country 
protection, taking into account changing circumstances. 
 Referring by analogy to the ruling in  Digital Rights Ireland , the Court held 
that, in view of the importance of the protection of personal data in the context 
of the fundamental right to privacy, review of the Commission ’ s adequacy 
decision should be strict. 66 Applying this standard, the CJEU identifi ed a number 
of inadequacies with the Safe Harbour arrangements, especially in relation to 
the processing of data pursuant to the NSA programmes. For example, self-
certifi cation under the arrangements is available only to US  ‘ organisations ’, 
which means that the principles do not apply to US public authorities. 67 
More importantly, the national security, public interest and law enforcement 
derogations under Annex I, referred to above, eff ectively meant that these 
interests could prevail over the fundamental rights of EU data subjects. As the 
Court put it, the derogations meant that the Safe Harbour decision: 
 enables interference, founded on national security and public interest requirements or 
on domestic legislation of the United States, with the fundamental rights of the persons 
whose personal data is or could be transferred from the European Union to the United 
States. 68 
 Moreover, as far as procedural safeguards were concerned, the Safe Harbour 
arrangements provided for enforcement only in relation to commercial disputes, 
with no safeguards whatsoever against state interference with fundamental 
rights. 
 63  Ibid., at [134]. 
 64  Ibid., at [136]. 
 65  Ibid., at [76]. 
 66  Ibid., at [78]. 
 67  Ibid., at [82]. 




 Accordingly, the combination of the broad derogations for public security 
and law enforcement, with a lack of legal remedies for access by state authorities, 
led the Court to conclude that the Safe Harbour Agreement failed to provide 
adequate protection under Art. 25 of the DPD, when read in the light of the 
Charter. In particular, the broad derogations were not limited to what was 
strictly necessary for the legitimate objectives of national security and law 
enforcement, as they enabled generalised, undiff erentiated storage of, and access 
to, personal data, without any limiting criteria. As the Court put it, citing  Digital 
Rights Ireland: 
 Legislation is not limited to what is strictly necessary where it authorises, on a 
generalised basis, storage of all the personal data of all the persons whose data has been 
transferred from the European Union to the United States without any diff erentiation, 
limitation or exception being made in light of the objective pursued and without an 
objective criterion being laid down by which to determine the limits of the access of the 
public authorities to the data, and of its subsequent use, for purposes which are specifi c, 
strictly restricted and capable of justifying the interference which both access to that 
data and its use entail … 69 
 From this, the CJEU concluded that the generalised access enabled by the 
Safe Harbour Agreement compromised the essence of the fundamental right 
to privacy guaranteed by Art. 7 of the Charter. 70 Moreover, the lack of legal 
recourse for state intrusions, such as the NSA surveillance, compromised the 
essence of the fundamental right to eff ective judicial protection, guaranteed 
by Art. 47 of the Charter. 71 Finally, Art. 3 of the Safe Harbour decision, which 
eff ectively limited the circumstances in which national supervisory authorities 
may suspend data fl ows to self-certifying organisations, impermissibly denied 
the power of supervisory authorities to independently examine complaints that 
a third country does not ensure an adequate level of protection. 72 In short, on a 
number of bases, but especially on the grounds that the Safe Harbour Agreement 
did not provide satisfactory protection against surveillance by US government 
authorities, the CJEU ruled that the Commission decision on adequacy was 
invalid. 
 While, on a superfi cial reading, it might appear that the CJEU ruling is 
based entirely on an interpretation of the adequacy requirement in Art. 25(1) of 
the DPD, a closer reading indicates that it is a ruling on the proportionality of 
extra-territorial state data surveillance, in which the Court builds upon previous 
rulings determining whether or not an infringement of the Art. 7 and 8 rights 
 69  Ibid., at [93]. 
 70  Ibid., at [94]. 
 71  Ibid., at [95]. 
 72  Ibid., at [102]. 
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is proportionate to emphasise the need for any derogations or limitations on 
the protection of personal data to be confi ned to what is strictly necessary. Th is 
interpretation follows from the following reasoning: the high level of protection 
of data privacy means that  ‘ adequate ’ protection must be interpreted as 
 ‘ essentially equivalent ’ protection; therefore the proportionality analysis applied 
to an EU law, such as the Data Retention Directive, must be applied  ipso facto 
in an  ‘ essentially equivalent ’ manner to the laws of a third country in assessing 
whether or not that jurisdiction provides adequate protection. 
 Th at said, it must be acknowledged that the Court ’ s explicit statements on the 
application of the proportionality principle are limited; one must to an extent 
read between the lines, taking into account the above implicit reasoning and the 
following three main points made by the Advocate General. First, analogous to 
the reasoning and language used in  Digital Rights Ireland , the Advocate General 
held that the almost unfettered access to personal data enjoyed by US intelligence 
agencies meant that the interference with Charter rights was  ‘ wide-ranging ’ and 
 ‘ particularly serious ’. 73 Second, distinguishing the reasoning in  Digital Rights 
Ireland , the Advocate General held that, as the PRISM programme enabled 
access to content, the interference was such as to compromise the  ‘ essence ’ of 
the fundamental right to privacy. 74 Th ird, the Advocate General applied the 
approach taken to the  ‘ strict necessity ’ test in  Digital Rights Ireland to eff ectively 
hold that the infringement was disproportionate as it allowed untargeted and 
indiscriminate access to all data, including content, of EU data subjects, without 
any relevant link to the general interest objective of national security. 75 
 Apart from the disproportionality fl owing from the undiff erentiated mass 
access to personal data, the Court ’ s decision on validity was, on my reading, 
infl uenced by the absence of any eff ective procedural safeguards, in the form of 
enforceable rights, available to EU data subjects. According to the jurisprudence 
of the CJEU, the proportionality analysis may be aff ected by the existence of 
procedural safeguards, such as where an otherwise problematic interference 
with rights may be found to be proportionate due to procedural guarantees. 76 
In relation to the Safe Harbour decision, however, the limitation of enforcement 
proceedings before the FTC to commercial disputes meant that EU data 
subjects had no administrative or judicial means of redress against access by 
US government authorities. As the Court itself explained, the Commission ’ s 
Safe Harbour decision completely failed to refer to  ‘ the existence of eff ective 
 73  Ibid., at [171]. 
 74  Ibid., at [177]. 
 75  Ibid., at [198]. 
 76  See  W. Sauter , above n. 12, p. 14, citing Joined  Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04 ,  Th e Queen, on 
the application of Alliance for Natural Health and Others v. Secretary of State for Health and 




legal protection ’ against interferences with fundamental rights resulting from 
measures originating from the US State. 77 
 6. LEGAL EVALUATION OF THE SCHREMS DECISION 
 Th e EU is a legal entity based upon the rule of law which, applying the EU 
Charter, incorporates the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms as 
signifi cant grounds for judicial review. Historically, review of EU-level measures 
by the CJEU, including in applying the principle of proportionality, has accorded 
a signifi cant degree of deference to EU institutions. Th e main reason for this level 
of deference has been a reluctance for the Court to second-guess policy decisions 
which involve complex political, economic and social choices. 78 As explained 
above, however, since the introduction of the Charter, the Court has adopted an 
increasingly strict approach to rights-based review of EU measures, especially 
in cases involving infringements of particular rights, such as the Charter rights 
to privacy and data privacy. Particularly in the context of data privacy, the 
combination of the express Art. 8 Charter right, which may well go beyond the 
right to privacy protected under Art. 8 of the ECHR, 79 and the objectives of 
the DPD have led the Court to apply a high level of protection to data subjects. 
To date, this can be regarded as culminating, in  Digital Rights Ireland , with the 
application of strict review to cases involving serious infringements to the rights 
to privacy and data privacy. 
 In most respects, the CJEU ’ s ruling in  Schrems amounts to little more than an 
application of the Court ’ s approach to proportionality, especially as formulated 
in  Digital Rights Ireland , to the context of the Commission ’ s Safe Harbour 
adequacy decision. Applying this approach, the unconstrained derogations for 
national security and law enforcement in Annex I of the agreement clearly failed 
the strict necessity test. Moreover, the absence of any procedural safeguards 
against widespread access and use of personal data by US government agencies 
was a signifi cant distinct consideration reinforcing the conclusion that the Safe 
Harbour decision was invalid as it allowed a disproportionate interference with 
rights. As distinct from  Digital Rights Ireland , however, the Court held that the 
interference allowed by the Safe Harbour Agreement compromised the  ‘ essence ’ 
of the relevant rights as it facilitated generalised access to communications 
content, as opposed to metadata. 
 77  Maximillian Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner ,  Case C-362/14 ,  6 October 2015 , 
at [89]. 
 78  See, e.g.,  Case C-491/01  R v. Secretary of State for Health, Ex p. British American Tobacco 
(Investments) Ltd and Imperial Tobacco Ltd [ 2002 ]  ECR I-11453 . 
 79  See, e.g., the reasoning of the English High Court in  Th e Queen v. Th e Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [ 2015 ]  EWHC 2092 . 
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 Of potentially more long-term legal signifi cance, however, may be the 
conclusion of the Court that the Commission decision on adequacy can be 
assessed taking into account factual and legal circumstances arising aft er the 
adoption of the decision. But, on this, the Court was careful to emphasise the 
distinctive characteristics of a decision on adequacy, which is intended to ensure a 
continuing and ongoing high level of protection in relation to transfers of personal 
data to third countries. As such, a failure of the Commission to appropriately 
review a decision in the light of important changes in circumstances, such as the 
Snowden revelations, may be as damaging to the protection of rights as a failure 
to adequately take into account known circumstances at the time of an original 
decision. 
 Th at said, the  Schrems ruling neither adds much to, nor advances the law, 
in relation to signifi cant unresolved legal issues concerning the application of 
the proportionality principle to contexts involving infringements to privacy and 
data privacy identifi ed earlier in this chapter. In particular, it does not resolve 
especially diffi  cult issues relating to whether or not the bulk, indiscriminate 
collection of personal data by intelligence agencies can ever be justifi able, which 
have been left  unclear by the Court ’ s ruling in  Digital Rights Ireland. At the time 
of writing, it was hoped that these issues would be more explicitly addressed, and 
potentially resolved, by the CJEU in its forthcoming ruling in the joined cases 
of  Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post-och telestyrelsen and  Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v. Davis and others; 80 and the forthcoming advice on the validity 
of the draft  PNR (Passenger Name Records) Canada agreement. 81 On the other 
hand, as explained in this chapter, the  Schrems case does provide an important 
opportunity for examining these legal issues in a broader factual and legal 
context, especially involving the protection of rights across territorial borders, 
which are taken up in the sections of this chapter immediately following. 
 7.  PROPORTIONALITY, PRIVACY RIGHTS 
AND DEMOCRACY 
 CJEU jurisprudence concerning the application of the principle of proportionately 
to interferences with the fundamental rights to privacy and data privacy has 
progressively increased the intensity of scrutiny applied to infringements and, 
 80  CJEU, Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 .  On 19 July 2016, Advocate-General Henrik 
Saugmandsgaard  Ø e issued an advisory opinion which, in part, concluded that a general data 
retention obligation may be compatible with EU law: ECLI:EU:C:2016:572 ( 19 July 2016 ) . 
 81  CJEU, Case A-1/15. On 8 September 2016, Advocate-General Paolo Mengozzi issued 
an Advisory Opinion fi nding that certain provisions of the draft  PNR agreement were 
incompatible with the EU Charter as not being suffi  ciently  ‘ targeted ’ :  Opinion 1/15 , 




concomitantly, decreased deference to EU-level policy-making. Rights-based 
judicial review of legislation and policy-making, based on a relatively  ‘ thick ’ 
concept of the rule of law, 82 such as that embodied in an expansive application 
of the principle of proportionality incorporating strict review, is controversial. 
Th e main objections to the eff ective substitution of a court ’ s decision to that 
of a policy-making institution, such as a legislature, relate to the relative lack 
of competency of the courts to take into account the complex considerations 
relevant to proper policy-making, and their lack of democratic accountability. 83 
Th is chapter is not the place to canvass these arguments; let alone to provide a 
satisfactory rebuttal to the claims of rights sceptics. In this section of the chapter, 
however, it is possible to provide some limited refl ections on the protection of 
privacy rights by the Court, and the relationship between privacy rights and 
democracy, in the context of the application of the principle of proportionality 
to trans-Atlantic data fl ows. 
 At base, liberal democracies depend upon some degree of mutual trust 
between citizens and State, which appears to be increasingly precarious, 
especially in Western democracies. 84 Th e asymmetric relationship between State 
and citizen necessarily engenders a degree of mutual suspicion. While the liberal 
State has a monopoly on legitimate power, intelligence-gathering and analysis 
are eff ectively delegated to specialised security agencies (and outsourced to 
sub-contractors), which have a relatively independent sphere of operation. 
Th e imperatives facing security agencies invariably tend to over-reach, with 
an almost gravitational attraction to total information surveillance. In periods 
of heightened and generalised security risk, elected offi  cials face incentives to 
publicly support expert security agencies, inexorably tending to capture. Once 
over-reach is revealed, however, trust is further eroded in what, eff ectively, may 
become a vicious cycle. 
 Th e extent to which democracies  – in the loosest sense of government by 
representatives accountable to the people  – depend upon a degree of trust 
draws attention to the pre-conditions for democratic government. Insuffi  cient 
or ineff ective limits on government intrusions on individual rights erodes 
the capacities of people to eff ectively participate in, and sustain, a democratic 
 82  See  J.  Goldsworthy ,  ‘ Legislative Sovereignty ’ in  T.  Campbell ,  K.D.  Ewing and  A.  Tomkins 
(eds.),  Sceptical Essays on Human Rights ,  Oxford University Press ,  Oxford  2001 ,  pp. 61 – 78 . 
 83  Th e literature, of course, is extensive. For some of the most sophisticated  ‘ rights-sceptic ’ 
arguments see:  J.  Waldron ,  Th e Dignity of Legislation ,  Cambridge University Press , 
 Cambridge  1999 ;  M.  Tushnet ,  Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts ,  Princeton 
University Press ,  Princeton  1999 . 
 84  Th is chapter was written before the 23 June 2016 referendum resulting in a majority vote 
in favour of the United Kingdom withdrawing from the European Union; that vote, being 
contrary to the position advocated by both major parties in the UK, seems to have been, in 
part, attributable to the trust defi cit. 
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polity. Although few would frame the issues in such unsophisticated terms, 
rights and democracy are not a zero-sum game but, in senses that count, are 
mutually reinforcing. In the context of mass government surveillance, if people 
perceive that their activities, and especially their online interactions, are being 
perpetually monitored, this undermines the very concepts of an engaged 
citizenry, democratic pluralism and free political debate. As Richards has put it: 
 When the government is keenly interested in what people are saying to confi dants in 
private, the content of that private activity is necessarily aff ected and skewed towards 
the ordinary, the inoff ensive, and the boring, even if the subject of surveillance is 
not a terrorist. If the government is watching what we say and who we talk to, so too 
will we make our choices accordingly. Th e ability of the government to monitor our 
communications is a powerful one, and one that cuts to the very core of our cognitive 
and expressive civil liberties. 85 
 To claim that rights to privacy and data privacy are essential to democracy 
does not, of course, entail that an expansive protection of these rights must be 
guaranteed by the courts. While governments have a tendency to be captured 
by national security agendas, as Waldron has cautioned, in times of national 
emergency courts have been reluctant to impose limits on government actions. 86 
Nevertheless, in the absence of eff ective internal limits, the courts are the main 
candidate for imposing limits on state power. Th e key questions then resolve to 
the extent of the courts ’ discretion in exercising rights-based review and the bases 
on which such discretion is exercised. But just as the principle of proportionality 
arose in eighteenth and nineteenth-century Prussia as a limit on the nascent 
growth of the administrative state in the absence of democratically imposed 
constraints, so the manifest failure of democratic processes to eff ectively curtail 
the excesses of state surveillance programmes, as revealed by Edward Snowden, 
suggests that the legal principle of proportionality has an important role to play 
in fi lling this gap in contemporary circumstances. 
 While the principle of proportionality may be an appropriate lens through 
which to analyse the balance between security and rights, it must be acknowledged 
that the application of the principle, and especially the necessity test and 
proportionality  stricto sensu , entails the Court substituting, at least to an extent, 
its own assessment of the merits of a law or policy for that of the promulgating 
institution. 87 Th e problem then becomes how eff ectively to limit the Court ’ s 
 85  N.M.  Richards ,  ‘ Intellectual Privacy ’ ( 2008 )  87  Texas Law Review  387, 433 . See also 
 D. Lyon , above n. 1, pp. 107 – 113. 
 86  J.  Waldron ,  ‘ Security and Liberty: Th e Image of Balance ’ ( 2003 )  11  Journal of Political 
Philosophy  191, 191 . 




discretion, as unconstrained decision-making can easily veer to the arbitrary. 
Th e answer is that the limits must come from internal constraints imposed by 
the Court on itself in the form of its reasoning process, or what Stone Sweet and 
Mathews have described as  ‘ an argumentation framework ’, meaning simply a 
system of reasoning that gives coherence by means of stable decision-making 
procedures. 88 While some, principally Alexy, claim that the proportionality 
balancing exercise can be conducted with almost mathematical precision, 89 
it remains essential for any analysis to incorporate suffi  cient fl exibility for the 
courts to remain sensitive to both signifi cant factors that may infl uence the 
analysis and the facts of instant cases. As explained in this chapter, however, 
the CJEU jurisprudence applying the principle of proportionality, especially in 
the context of infringements of the rights to privacy and data privacy, has so far 
produced a degree of legal uncertainty including, importantly, in relation to the 
precise level of scrutiny to be applied to limitations on the rights, and whether 
the bulk collection of data can ever be proportionate. Th at said, the continued 
and growing importance of privacy rights to a democratic constitution, in 
contemporary circumstances, suggests that the Court has been correct in 
according less deference to EU institutions when these rights are implicated. 
Nevertheless, a greater degree of precision and discipline in identifying and 
explaining the legal constraints on the proportionality analysis would help 
signifi cantly to dissipate concerns about potential judicial over-reach, as well as 
to add much-needed certainty. 
 8.  PROPORTIONALITY, TRANS-ATLANTIC AND 
TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS 
 On any approach taken to the balancing of rights and security, the mass, 
indiscriminate data surveillance by US government agencies, with no eff ective 
procedural safeguards, as revealed by Snowden, would be disproportionate. 90 
In the online environment, however, interferences with rights, such as 
disproportionate surveillance by state agencies, may occur at a distance. 91 Th e 
 88  A.  Stone Sweet and  J.  Mathews ,  ‘ Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism ’ 
( 2008 )  47  Columbia Journal of Transnational Law  73, 89 – 90 . 
 89  R.  Alexy ,  A Th eory of Constitutional Rights ,  trans .  J.  Rivers ,  Oxford University Press ,  Oxford 
 2002 ; see also  M.  Klatt and  M.  Meister ,  Th e Constitutional Structure of Proportionality , 
 Oxford University Press ,  Oxford  2012 . 
 90  In Europe, these practices would be in breach of the distinct proportionality principles in 
national laws, as well as the principles applied by the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts. 
 91  As Brown and Korff  put it:  ‘ the global infrastructure of the Internet and electronic 
communications has made surveillance of  … extraterritorial communications easier ’ : 
 I.  Brown and  D.  Korff ,  ‘ Foreign Surveillance: Law and Practice in a Global Digital 
Environment ’ ( 2014 )  3  European Human Rights Law Review  243, 245 . 
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border-transgressing features of online communications raise conspicuous 
problems of transborder protection of rights. As territorial legal jurisdictions 
commonly provide less protection to foreigners than is accorded domestic citizens 
and residents, 92 transborder infringements of rights commonly escape judicial 
rights-based review. Th e DPD ’ s requirement that transfers of personal data to 
third countries should be permissible only where that jurisdiction provides an 
adequate level of protection implements the EU ’ s obligation to protect the rights 
of EU data subjects irrespective of territorial borders. Th e mechanism whereby 
the Commission determines the adequacy of a legal regime of a third country, 
however, raises the spectre of one legal jurisdiction imposing its standards 
on other jurisdictions in order to ensure the fl ow of transborder data, which 
has become essential to global commerce. Th e Commission ’ s decision, back 
in July 2000, approving the Safe Harbour Agreement was clearly a pragmatic 
political compromise, which accorded some protection to data subject to trans-
Atlantic transfers, while ensuring the continuation of the vital transborder trade. 
However, as explained in this chapter, the CJEU ’ s ruling in  Schrems confi rms that 
any political agreement regarding adequacy must comply with the high level of 
protection of the rights to privacy and data privacy guaranteed by EU law. 
 In an era of mass transborder data fl ows, questions relating to the obligations 
of territorially based states to protect the rights of people physically located 
outside of their territory have become increasingly pressing. Th e lacuna in legal 
protection clearly opens the door to mass, unconstrained interference with 
rights across borders. Th e prevalence of these practices, as revealed by Snowden, 
exposes a signifi cant gap in international human rights protection. Th is gap is 
too important to leave to essentially political negotiations between state parties 
even where, as is the case with data fl ows from the EU, such agreements are 
subject to rights-based judicial review. While some, including the UN Human 
Rights Committee, interpret existing international human rights law as imposing 
rights-based obligations on states where their actions have extra-territorial 
eff ects, 93 the legal position is far from clear. More importantly, signifi cant state 
actors, and especially the US, continue to refuse to accept that their international 
human rights obligations extend to actions and persons outside their territorial 
borders. 94 
 Th e CJEU ruling in  Schrems invalidating the Safe Harbour decision, and 
the negotiations between the EU and US concerning a replacement agreement, 
 92  For example, in  Verdugo-Urquidez , the US Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment 
does not apply to the search and seizure by US agents of property owned by a non-resident 
alien and located in a foreign country:  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez ,  494 U.S. 259 ( 1990 ) . 
 93  United Nations Human Rights Committee ,  Concluding observations on the fourth 
periodic report of the United States of America ,  CCPR/C/USA/CO/4 ,  p. 2 . 




should not be seen in isolation from international human rights law. Just as the 
principle of proportionality is applied by the Court in relation to personal data 
originating from the EU, transborder rights obligations should ideally apply to all 
transfers of personal data, of whatever origin. Applying a broad proportionality 
principle would ensure that the transborder surveillance practices of state actors 
are both appropriately targeted and incorporate suffi  cient procedural safeguards. 
Nevertheless, just as this chapter has argued for greater clarity and rigour in 
the development and exposition of the proportionality principle under EU law, 
so there is a pressing need for clarifi cation of the position under international 
human rights law, and ideally for the development of an appropriate transborder 
framework for the application of a proportionality principle. In this, the 
developing jurisprudence of the CJEU may serve as a test-bed; but there clearly 
remains work to be done at both the EU and international levels. In this respect, 
it is hoped that the opportunities presented by the impending CJEU decisions 
involving bulk data collection will give rise to signifi cant developments, 
including in appropriately refi ning the proportionality principle. 
 9. THE  ‘ PRIVACY SHIELD ’ AND PROPORTIONALITY 
 Following the Snowden revelations, the European Commission adopted two 
communications identifying weaknesses with the Safe Harbour Agreement in 
the light of the revelations and setting out a plan for restoring trust in trans-
Atlantic data fl ows. 95 Th ereaft er, in 2014, negotiations between the US and the 
EU commenced with a view to revising the Safe Harbour Agreement to take 
into account the Commission ’ s concerns, but failed to advance due mainly 
to diffi  culties experienced in negotiating a separate agreement, known as the 
 ‘ Umbrella Agreement ’, that was designed to deal with trans-Atlantic cooperation, 
including data-sharing, relating to criminal and terrorism investigations. 96 
 95  European Commission ,  Communication to the European Parliament and the Council 
on Rebuilding Trust in EU-US Data Flows  (COM(2013) 846 fi nal)  27 November 2013 ; 
 European Commission ,  Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the Functioning of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies 
Established in the EU  (COM(2013) 847 fi nal)  27 November 2013 . 
 96  R.  Massey and  H.E.  Sussman ,  ‘ Th e US-EU safe harbor framework is invalid: now what? ’ 
( 2016 )  22 ( 1 )  CTLR (Computer and Telecommunications Law Review)  1 . On 2 June 2016, 
representatives of the US and EU announced the signing of the  ‘ Umbrella ’ agreement: 
 European Commission ,  ‘ Joint EU-U.S. press statement following the EU-U.S. Justice and 
Home Aff airs Ministerial Meeting ’ ,  Amsterdam ,  2 June 2016 . Th e agreement was approved 
by the European Parliament on 1 December 2016, but implementation in the US may be 
complicated by the approach of the incoming Trump administration:  D. Bender ,  ‘ European 
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Th e  Schrems ruling, however, made it imperative for a new agreement to be 
reached; and the Article 29 Working Party, which consists of data protection 
regulators of Member States, set the end of January 2016 as the deadline for 
the European Commission and the US to reach agreement before enforcement 
actions, arising from the invalidation of the Safe Harbour Agreement, would be 
taken. Th is section of the chapter explains and analyses the proposed replacement 
agreement, with a focus on the role of proportionality in assessing the adequacy 
of the proposed agreement. 97 
 Eventually, on 2 February 2016, the European Commission and the US 
Department of Commerce announced that they had reached a political 
agreement, known as the Privacy Shield, designed to replace the Safe Harbour 
Agreement. 98 Nevertheless, the details of the agreement were not published 
until 29 February 2016, when the Commission released a communication, 99 a 
draft  adequacy determination 100 and the annexed text of the Privacy Shield. Th e 
agreement was aimed at ensuring an adequate ( ‘ essentially equivalent ’ ) level of 
protection by satisfactorily addressing the problems identifi ed by the CJEU with 
the Safe Harbour Agreement while, as might be expected from an international 
agreement, embodying a series of political compromises. Signifi cantly, 
enforcement of the Privacy Shield on US organisations remains based on 
self-certifi cation of compliance with privacy principles, subject to overview by 
the FTC. 
 Th e main features of the Privacy Shield Framework are as follows: 
 –  A revised and strengthened set of privacy principles, including a notice 
principle that requires a link to the Privacy Shield List (a list of self-certifying 
organisations maintained by the US Department of Commerce and including 
organisations removed from the list) and reference to the individual right of 
 97  Since this chapter was written, on 8 July 2016 the European Commission adopted the 
fi nal version of the Privacy Shield which came into eff ect on the same day:  European 
Commission ,  Commission Implementing Decision of 12.7.2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided 
by the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield ,  C(2016) 4176 fi nal ,  12 July 2016 . On 27 October 2016, Digital 
Rights Ireland lodged a challenge to the Privacy Shield before the CJEU: J. Fioretti and 
D. Volz,  ‘ Privacy group launches legal challenge against EU-U.S. data pact ’ ,  reuters.com , 
27 October 2016,  http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-dataprotection-usa-idUSKCN12Q2JK . 
 98  European Commission ,  ‘ EU Commission and United States agree on new framework for 
trans-Atlantic data fl ows: EU-US Privacy Shield ’ , Press Release, 02.02.2016  < http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-216_en.htm?locale=en > . 
 99  EUROPEAN COMMISSION ,  Communication to the European Parliament and the Council, 
Transatlantic Data Flows: Restoring Trust through Strong Safeguards  (COM(2016) 117 fi nal) 
 20.02.2016 . 
 100  European Commission , Draft  Commission Implementing Decision pursuant to Directive 
95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection 




access to personal data, and an onward transfer principle that places some 
limits on transfers of personal data to third parties. 
 –  Revised enforcement and liability mechanisms, conferring greater rights on 
EU data subjects. Th e new redress mechanisms include: an obligation on self-
certifying organisations to designate an independent dispute settlement body 
to address complaints; a commitment by the Department of Commerce to 
receive and undertake best eff orts to resolve complaints, including receiving 
complaints from EU member data protection authorities; a commitment by 
the FTC to give priority consideration to referrals of con-compliance with the 
privacy principles and to receive complaints directly from individuals; and an 
obligation on self-certifying organisations to cooperate with EU Member State 
data protection authorities. 
 –  As a  ‘ last resort ’ recourse mechanism, aft er the exhaustion of all other avenues, 
binding arbitration is to be available from a Privacy Shield Panel, consisting 
of at least 20 arbitrators selected jointly by the US Department of Commerce 
and the European Commission, and which can award non-monetary equitable 
relief. 
 –  Increased transparency, and overview mechanisms, of access to personal data 
of EU data subjects by US public authorities, including intelligence agencies. 
As explained in the Commission ’ s draft  adequacy decision, a range of internal 
and political oversight and transparency mechanisms apply to US intelligence 
agencies. Nevertheless, as the draft  decision acknowledged, available recourse 
mechanisms for EU data subjects against US public authorities are limited and, 
in some cases, such as activities authorised under EO-12333, non-existent. 
To address this, in a letter from the US Secretary of State set out in Annex 
III of the draft  decision, the US government undertook to create a Privacy 
Shield Ombudsperson to receive and respond to complaints about US public 
authorities. Th e proposed scheme requires individual complaints to be directed 
to the EU Member State bodies responsible for oversight of security services, 
then sent to a centralised EU complaint handling body (if created), before 
being referred to the Ombudsperson to investigate whether US laws have been 
complied with. 
 –  Limitations and derogations from privacy principles for US public authorities 
for national security, public interest and law enforcement purposes. Annex II, 
Section I.5 to the Privacy Shield draft  adequacy decision specifi cally provides 
that adherence to the privacy principles is  ‘ limited to the extent necessary to 
meet national security, public interest or law enforcement requirements ’. 101 
Accordingly, in making a determination on adequacy, the Commission was 
required to assess limitations under US law relating to national security, public 
interest or law enforcement purposes. In particular, the Commission ’ s draft  
 101  Ibid., Recital (52). 
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adequacy decision refers to limitations on the activities of US intelligence 
agencies that have been imposed since the Snowden revelations and, especially, 
limitations imposed by Presidential Policy Directive 28 ( ‘ PPD-28 ’ ), a binding 
Presidential directive which applies to  ‘ signals intelligence ’ activities, issued on 
17 January 2014. According to PPD-28, signals intelligence may be collected 
only where there is a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purpose and 
collection of personal data must always be  ‘ as tailored as feasible ’. Elaborating 
on this, the draft  adequacy decision refers to representations of the US Offi  ce of 
the Director of National Intelligence ( ‘ ODNI ’ ), in a letter set out in Annex VI 
to the draft  decision, which explain that, while bulk collection of signals 
intelligence is sometimes necessary, there is a general rule preferring targeted 
collection. 102 In addition, the US government assured the Commission that it 
does not engage in  ‘ indiscriminate surveillance ’ and that any bulk collection 
of Internet data, including via access to trans-Atlantic cables, applies only to a 
 ‘ small proportion of the Internet ’. 103 
 –  An annual joint review of the Privacy Shield framework, involving the 
European Commission, the US Department of Commerce and the FTC, and 
being open to all EU data protection authorities, resulting in a public report 
prepared by the Commission and submitted to the European Parliament and 
the Council. 
 Since its release, the Privacy Shield agreement has been subject to considerable 
analysis, and criticism, including by relevant EU-level institutions. On 13 April 
2016, the Article 29 Working Party published its opinion on the Privacy Shield 
draft  adequacy decision. 104 While welcoming the improvements made by the 
Privacy Shield when compared with the Safe Harbour Agreement, the Working 
Party identifi ed a number of important shortcomings which, in its view, need 
to be resolved or clarifi ed in order for the agreement to confer the high level 
of protection required for an adequacy decision. Given its focus, it is beyond 
the scope of this chapter to engage in a detailed critical analysis of all aspects 
of the complex Privacy Shield agreement. Instead, this section of the chapter 
concentrates on the main problems identifi ed by the Working Party and its 
assessment of the extent to which the agreement satisfi es the requirements of 
necessity and proportionality. 105 
 102  Ibid., Recital (59). 
 103  Ibid., Recital (69). 
 104  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party , Opinion 01/2016 on the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield draft  adequacy decision, 16/EN WP 238, Adopted on 13 April 2016. 
 105  On 24 May 2016, the European Parliament agreed to a joint resolution on the Privacy 
Shield which, amongst other things, called on the European Commission to implement 
the recommendations made by the Article 29 Working Party in its Privacy Shield opinion: 




the Rules of Procedure, 24 May 2016. Subsequently, on 30 May 2016, the European Data 
Protection Supervisor released an opinion on the Privacy Shield draft  adequacy decision 
which expressed very similar concerns to those set out in the Working Party ’ s opinion: 
 European Data Protection Supervisor ,  Opinion on the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield draft 
adequacy decision ,  Opinion 4/2016 ,  30 May 2016 . 
 106  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party ,  Opinion 01/2016 on the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield draft  adequacy decision , 16/EN WP 238, Adopted on 13 April 2016, pp. 12 – 14. 
 107  Ibid. pp. 17 – 18. 
 108  Ibid., pp. 51 – 52. 
 109  Ibid., p. 58. 
 Overall, the Working Party considered that the format adopted by the Privacy 
Shield, with the relevant principles and guarantees being set out in both the 
adequacy decision and annexes to the decision, resulted in a lack of clarity and, 
at times, inconsistency. 106 Consequently, the Working Party called for further 
clarifi cation and consistency in the draft  decision, including the preparation 
of a glossary of terms. In relation to transfers of personal data by commercial 
organisations, the Working Party pointed to signifi cant omissions in the privacy 
principles when compared with EU data privacy law, including the lack of a 
data retention limitation principle, requiring organisations to delete data if they 
are no longer necessary, and a lack of legal guarantees for individuals subject 
to automated decisions which produce legal eff ects or otherwise signifi cantly 
aff ect an individual. 107 On the key issue of limitations and derogations from the 
privacy principles for US public authorities, the Working Party engaged in an 
analysis of the relevant US legal framework, including PPD-28, EO-12333 and 
the ODNI letter set out in Annex VI to the Commission ’ s draft  decision. While 
acknowledging the signifi cant steps taken by the US to increase transparency of 
the practices of security agencies since the Snowden revelations, the Working 
Party concluded that, in important respects, the draft  adequacy decision lacked 
clarity on the limitations and the extent of safeguards under US law. In particular, 
the Working Party was concerned that US law (and practice) did not exclude 
the possibility of mass, indiscriminate data collection; and that the role of the 
proposed Privacy Shield Ombudsperson was not spelt out in suffi  cient detail. 108 
In particular, the Working Party considered that the powers and position of the 
Ombudsperson needed to be clarifi ed to demonstrate that the role was truly 
independent and capable of off ering eff ective remedies. Given that these issues 
are central to any assessment of the extent to which the Privacy Shield complies 
with the CJEU ’ s ruling in  Schrems , including the analysis of proportionality, this 
section of the Working Party ’ s analysis is expanded upon immediately below. 
Finally, the Working Party welcomed the ongoing annual joint review process 
for the Privacy Shield, but recommended clarifi cation and agreement on the 
elements to be included in the joint reviews. 109 
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 110  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party ,  Working Document 01/2016 on the 
justifi cation of interferences with the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection through 
surveillance measures when transferring data (European Essential Guarantees) , 16/EN WP 
237, Adopted on 13 April 2016. 
 111  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party ,  Opinion 01/2016 on the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield draft  adequacy decision , 16/EN WP 238, Adopted on 13 April 2016, pp. 11 – 12. 
 As explained above, on the analysis presented in this chapter, in  Schrems 
the CJEU found that the Safe Harbour Agreement was invalid mainly on the 
basis that the broad derogation for national security, public interest and law 
enforcement requirements in Annex I to the Commission decision, which 
allowed for bulk collection and access to personal data by US public authorities, 
was disproportionate to the legitimate objectives of national security and law 
enforcement. Th is conclusion was reinforced by a lack of enforceable remedies, 
and absence of procedural safeguards, for EU data subjects in relation to the 
actions of US public authorities. It is therefore unsurprising that the most 
signifi cant weaknesses with the Privacy Shield draft  decision identifi ed by 
the Working Party concern the extent to which the derogations for US public 
authorities in Annex II to the draft  decision fail to comply with EU jurisprudence 
relating to the protection of fundamental rights. 
 In undertaking this analysis, the Working Party adopted a framework which 
it set out in a working document on the justifi cation of interferences with the 
rights to privacy and data privacy through surveillance measures, especially in 
the context of data transfers to the US, which it published contemporaneously 
with its Privacy Shield opinion. 110 Given the policy orientation of the Working 
Party ’ s analysis, its approach to justifi cations for interferences with privacy rights 
is unsurprisingly more structured and complete than that applied by the CJEU 
in invalidating the Safe Harbour Agreement in  Schrems. Drawing on the human 
rights jurisprudence of both the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts, the working 
document formulated the following four European Essential Guarantees, which 
must be in place if interferences to fundamental rights are to be justifi able: 
 A.  Processing should be in accordance with the law and based on clear, precise 
an accessible rules. 
 B.  Necessity and proportionality with regard to the legitimate objectives 
pursued need to be demonstrated. 
 C.  An independent oversight mechanism should exist, which is both eff ective 
and impartial. 
 D.  Eff ective remedies need to be available to the individual. 111 
 Regarding Guarantee A, which essentially relates to the foreseeability of lawful 




 112  Ibid., p. 37. 
 113  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party ,  Working Document 01/2016 on the 
justifi cation of interferences with the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection through 
surveillance measures when transferring data (European Essential Guarantees) , 16/EN WP 
237, Adopted on 13 April 2016, p. 8. 
 114  Ibid., p. 12. 
noted the signifi cant improvements in the transparency of US public intelligence 
activities since the Snowden revelations, including information published in 
relevant PCLOB reports and limitations introduced by PPD-28. Nevertheless, 
especially in light of remaining uncertainties concerning the operation of 
EO-112333, the Working Party concluded that, without further clarifi cation, 
it was impossible to determine whether the US regime was suffi  ciently 
foreseeable. 112 
 On the analysis presented in this chapter, the availability of procedural 
safeguards, including eff ective remedies, is relevant to the proportionality 
assessment; it is therefore appropriate to consider Guarantees B to D together. 
One possible reading of the  Schrems ruling is that, building on  Digital Rights 
Ireland , the CJEU eff ectively concluded that bulk collection of personal data by 
US intelligence agencies can never be proportionate. Nevertheless, as pointed 
out by the Working Party in its working document on justifi cations, to date 
neither the Strasbourg nor the Luxembourg courts appear to have adopted a 
fi nal position on whether or not bulk collection can ever be justifi able, with 
some clarifi cation on this issue expected from the forthcoming CJEU decisions 
referred to earlier in this chapter. 113 Th at said, and while noting that the 
application of proportionality to this area may be qualifi ed or revised by the 
CJEU in the impending decisions, the Working Party reiterated its consistent 
conclusion that  ‘ massive and indiscriminate collection of data (non-targeted 
bulk collection) in any case cannot be considered proportionate ’. 114 Th is means 
that the extent to which collection of data by intelligence agencies is targeted 
so as to be related to legitimate national security objectives must be absolutely 
central to the proportionality analysis, especially where communications content 
is collected. 
 As explained above, since the Snowden revelations, the US government has 
taken steps to ensure that intelligence gathering is less indiscriminate, including 
the injunction in PPD-28 that collection of personal data must always be  ‘ as 
tailored as feasible ’. Nevertheless, as made clear in the ODNI letter annexed 
to the Commission ’ s draft  adequacy decision, the US continues to reserve the 
right to engage in bulk collection of signals intelligence where necessary. As, 
according to publicly available information, US intelligence agencies continue 
to engage in bulk, indiscriminate collection, or at least refuse to exclude doing 
so, the Working Party reached the inevitable conclusion that the Privacy Shield, 
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 115  Article 29 Data Protection Working Party ,  Opinion 01/2016 on the EU-U.S. Privacy 
Shield draft  adequacy decision , 16/EN WP 238, Adopted on 13 April 2016, p. 40. 
 116  Ibid., p. 40. 
 117  Ibid., pp. 42 – 43. 
 118  Ibid., pp. 49 – 51. 
by not ruling this out, allowed a disproportionate interference with rights. 115 
Above and beyond this, the Working Party expressed concerns that the broad 
assurance that data collection would be  ‘ as tailored as feasible ’ could still allow 
for massive data collection, which might also fail the proportionality test. 116 
Accordingly, the Working Party, at a minimum, required further information on 
mass collection practices by US intelligence agencies before a fi nal conclusion on 
adequacy could be reached. 
 Regarding the need for eff ective and independent oversight, the Working 
Party noted the substantial internal oversight mechanisms in place in the US, but 
pointed out that eff ective oversight depends on an independent, external body. 
As there is no oversight whatsoever of surveillance programmes undertaken 
pursuant to EO-12333, Guarantee C could hardly be satisfi ed in relation to these 
programmes. Moreover, the regime administered by the FISA Court provides no 
eff ective oversight for non-US persons. 117 
 As explained earlier in this chapter, in the  Schrems ruling, the CJEU 
identifi ed the absence of any eff ective legal remedies against US public 
authorities as an important weakness in the Safe Harbour Agreement, and 
also found that the lack of legal recourse against state intrusions compromised 
Art. 47 of the Charter. Signifi cant elements of the Privacy Shield are aimed at 
improving the legal recourse mechanisms available to EU persons. In relation 
to the activities of US public authorities, the main new recourse avenue is the 
proposal to create a Privacy Shield Ombudsperson, to receive and respond to 
individual complaints. While welcoming the introduction of this new recourse 
mechanism, the Working Party concluded that the Privacy Shield failed to 
specify the powers and position of the Ombudsperson with suffi  cient detail, 
leaving doubts regarding its independence from government, the extent of 
its investigatory powers, its remedial powers, and the absence of an appeals 
process. 118 As explained above, according to the Working Party, the two major 
factors compromising the adequacy of the Commission ’ s draft  decision are the 
failure of the Privacy Shield to exclude untargeted mass collection of data by 
US security agencies and the lack of clarity regarding the role and powers of the 
Ombudsperson. Both of these shortcomings arise from the disproportionality of 
the US legal and administrative regimes that apply to the collection and analysis 





 Th e Privacy Shield, as a negotiated international agreement, necessarily 
embodied compromises between the parties. It is clear that both parties to the 
negotiation, the US Department of Commerce and the European Commission, 
share interests in ensuring the continued viability of trans-Atlantic data transfers 
while insulating the agreement against the potential for an adverse CJEU ruling. 
Th e negotiations took place in the shadow of considerable uncertainties in the 
CJEU ’ s application of the proportionality principle to mass data collection, 
including uncertainties arising from the rulings in  Digital Rights Ireland and 
 Schrems , and including whether or not bulk collection by security agencies can 
ever be proportionate. Th ese uncertainties enabled the negotiators to conclude 
that a regime in which some form of bulk collection by security agencies is 
restricted, but not ruled out could, nevertheless, be adequate. Th e Commission 
also concluded that the Privacy Shield Ombudsperson mechanism provided 
suffi  cient safeguards for EU data subjects, including by receiving individual 
complaints and investigating compliance with US law. Nevertheless, the 
agreement and the Commission ’ s draft  decision cannot disguise the hallmarks 
of haste. On the basis of the CJEU ’ s ruling in  Schrems , the Working Party ’ s 
conclusions that more information on US mass data collection practices and 
on the details of the ombudsperson mechanism is needed before an adequacy 
decision can be made must surely be correct. But, that said, as argued in this 
chapter, gaps and ambiguities in the CJEU ’ s proportionality analysis mean that 
precisely what changes might be required for the agreement to be adequate, 
including whether the US must undertake to engage only in targeted data 
collection, is necessarily uncertain; and may require further rulings by the CJEU, 
some of which are forthcoming, to be clarifi ed. 
 10. CONCLUSION 
 In Europe, proportionality has emerged as a meta-principle which, among 
other things, is the key legal standard for establishing the balance between the 
protection of rights, on the one hand, and public policies, on the other. Th us, 
it is unsurprising that the principle, as applied by the CJEU, has played the 
central role in establishing the balance between state surveillance and the rights 
to privacy and data privacy in cases such as  Digital Rights Ireland , but also, as 
argued in this chapter, underpins the  Schrems ruling. As illustrated by these 
cases, under the infl uence of the EU Charter, the Court has taken an increasingly 
expansive approach to the protection of privacy and data privacy, according less 
deference to EU policy-making institutions. Th is is clearly refl ected in the level of 
scrutiny applied to interferences with these rights, which under proportionality 
analysis now requires a form of strict review. While a degree of fl exibility and 
sensitivity to the facts of instant cases must be retained by courts applying the 
proportionality principle this should not, however, be at the expense of properly 
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constrained judicial decision-making. Applying a rigorous approach to the 
application of the proportionality principle is essential if courts are to escape 
charges of arbitrarily substituting their judgments for those of policy-making 
institutions, and for the promotion of greater certainty and predictability. Yet, 
as this chapter has explained, the jurisprudence of the CJEU, culminating in 
the  Digital Rights Ireland and  Schrems rulings, has given rise to signifi cant legal 
uncertainties, including in relation to the standard and intensity of review of 
measures that may interfere with the rights to privacy and data privacy and, 
from a policy-making perspective, creating much uncertainty about whether 
bulk data collection is ever permissible. 
 Despite weaknesses with the CJEU ’ s approach to proportionality, this 
chapter contends that the principle is the correct legal framework for evaluating 
infringements of fundamental rights, including the rights to privacy and data 
privacy. Th is is because, applying a rights-based perspective, the principle 
ensures that the courts ask the right questions. While rights sceptics contend 
that rights-based judicial review, such as that undertaken in jurisdictions with 
a  ‘ thick ’ concept of the rule of law, is somehow antithetical to democracy, the 
appropriate protection of rights is a pre-condition to sustainable democratic 
polities. Th is is especially the case where democratic processes are incapable 
of eff ectively limiting state-based intrusions, which appears to be the case with 
the apparently inexorable drive to broader and more intensive surveillance 
practices by state intelligence agencies. In this context, an appropriately defi ned 
proportionality principle may well be the main legal bulwark against privacy and 
democracy-corrosive practices. 
 While mass indiscriminate surveillance, with no adequate procedural 
safeguards, would fall foul of any rights-based review, extra-territorial 
surveillance by state-based agencies may escape review in jurisdictions where 
rights are not extended to foreigners. Under EU law, the requirement that 
transborder transfers of personal data should be permissible only where a third 
country provides adequate protection is a mechanism for ensuring transborder 
protection of the rights of EU data subjects. Nevertheless, the need for a 
single jurisdiction, such as the EU, to establish such a mechanism, refl ects a 
signifi cant limitation of the international human rights framework. In an era of 
ubiquitous transborder transfers of personal data, where rights can be readily 
invaded at a distance, the proper protection of rights must entail limitations 
on extra-territorial interferences by state parties. Th e proportionality principle, 
appropriately defi ned and rigorously applied, is an eminently suitable legal 
rubric for evaluating the extra-territorial surveillance practices of state agencies. 
 Th e current process of revising the data transfer arrangements between 
the EU and the US, in the shadow of the  Schrems ruling, therefore represents 
a highly signifi cant test of the principles that should apply to transborder data 
surveillance practices. As explained in this chapter, however, uncertainties in the 




proportionality principle, have complicated the process for fi nalising a US-EU 
framework to replace the invalidated Safe Harbour Agreement. Th e uncertain 
jurisprudence has, in particular, created wriggle room for the European 
Commission to conclude, in its February 2016 draft  decision on the Privacy 
Shield, that a US regime that fails to suffi  ciently exclude the possibility of bulk 
data collection, and includes scant details on the key ombudsperson recourse 
mechanism, nevertheless confers the required high level of protection of the 
rights to privacy and data privacy of EU data subjects. Yet, the Article 29 Working 
Party was surely correct to express serious concerns that, at a minimum, without 
further details concerning US bulk collection practices and the ombudsperson 
mechanism, it would be imprudent to conclude that the Privacy Shield 
agreement confers adequate protection. At the time of writing this chapter, the 
position was further complicated by the prospect of two impending, and likely 
highly relevant, CJEU rulings on the critical issue of bulk data collection. Th ese 
two related pending developments  – the process for adjusting the Privacy Shield 
agreement so that it is able to comply with EU law and the forthcoming CJEU 
rulings  – seem likely to set the framework establishing the permissible limits on 
state based surveillance, especially in the trans-Atlantic context, for some time 
to come. As this chapter argues, the development of a clearer, more rigorously 
elaborated proportionality principle by the CJEU would serve both to better 
protect the rights of EU data subjects and add much-needed commercial and 
political certainty.  
